By Pasi Tuunainen
This publication analyzes the multi-faceted phenomenon of Finnish army effectiveness within the iciness conflict (1939–40). Drawing on a big selection of basic and secondary resources, Pasi Tuunainen indicates how by way of concentrating on their very own strengths and pitting those opposed to the weaknesses in their adversary, the Finns have been capable of inflict heavy casualties at the pink military when minimizing their very own losses. The Finns have been capable of use their assets for potent operational reasons, and practice virtually to their complete strength. The Finnish small-unit strategies applied the terrain and Arctic stipulations for which they'd ready themselves, in addition to forming cohesive devices of well-motivated and qualitatively greater expert leaders and citizen infantrymen who may innovate and adapt. The Finnish military had powerful logistics, aid and provide platforms that saved the troops fighting.
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Extra resources for Finnish Military Effectiveness in the Winter War, 1939-1940
Strategic policies of FHC need to be assessed, as successes at the operational level can prove useless unless strategic policies are viable. In the 1920s, the Finns did not think of operational art, and associated operations with military action between division and army corps levels. Everything below that was tactical. In order to prevail at war, all levels of warfare need to be synchronized with national policies, have the same goals and be in line with each other. It is sometimes difficult to make out the differences between operational and tactical levels.
The sixth chapter contains an overall assessment of the reasons why Finland survived the Winter War. An answer is given as to why the Finns were able to generate sufficient fighting power from their resources. The processes through which they were able to convert their resources for effective operational use are described. What were the sources of their national resilience? The Winter War also meant serious challenges that the Finns had to overcome in order to succeed and exhibit relative military effectiveness.
85 Belligerents’ willingness to end hostilities in early 1940, argues Dan Reiter, meant that the war-termination behavior of leaders was directly INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS 37 linked to military performance and information received on combat capabilities and intentions. Reiter set out to examine the reactions of the Soviet leadership to battlefield setbacks and the reasons why they ended the war and accepted limited gains instead of pursuing an absolute victory. Reiter argues that the reason for the fact that Stalin decided to lower Soviet war aims was the Red Army’s ‘unexpectedly poor’ performance that harmed the reputation of the Soviet military.