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Additional resources for Global Financial Crises and Reforms: Cases and Caveats
Episodes in which the beginning of a banking crisis is followed by a balance-of-payment crisis within 48 months are classified as twin crises. 7, labeled 80 percent to 100 percent. It appears that crises are not simply a story of an overvalued exchange rate or too rapid a monetary expansion. In about 30 percent of the currency crises, 80 percent or more of the indicators were sending signals. The economies appear to be particularly frail on the eve of twin crises, with a higher proportion of the indicators signaling.
For banking crises, any signal given within the 12-month period before the beginning of the crisis or within 12 months following the beginning of the crisis is labeled a good signal. The two different signaling windows for currency and banking crises have to do with the different timing of the peaks of both crises, as previously discussed. In addition, the events that mark the beginning of a banking crisis are often not seen as systemic at the time and are not treated by policymakers as harbingers of a crisis.
Section I dealt with the definition and dating of banking and currency crises, while the previous section and the Data Appendix discuss the indicators. In this subsection, we describe the approach used to define what is a signal and what is a reasonable period of time. The interval between signals and crisis: defining a reasonable period of time In what follows, the maximum interval of time between the signal and the crisis, was decided upon a priori as 24 months in the case of balance of payments crises.